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Beyond cost and carbon: The multidimensional co-benefits of low carbon transitions in Europe 
1. Introduction 
 In this study, based on a mixed methods approach, we catalogue 128 prospective co-
benefits to four European low carbon transitions. This includes 30 co-benefits for French 
nuclear power, 30 co-benefits for German solar photovoltaics (PV), 26 co-benefits for 
Norwegian electric vehicles (EVs), and 42 co-benefits for smart meters in Great Britain. 
Tellingly, 37 of these collective benefits are identified as economic and 14 environmental, but 
the remaining ones illustrate a broader spectrum of technical, social, and political benefits 
(77 in total).  
 The study is structured as follows. It firstly defines and conceptualizes the co-benefits 
to climate change mitigation and low carbon transitions.  It then justifies the four case studies 
of France, Germany, Norway, and Great Britain, and explains its primary research methods of 
expert interviews, public focus groups, and the utilization of public internet forums.  Then, it 
presents the 128 identified potential co-benefits.  After presenting this body of evidence, the 
paper then discusses and theorizes these benefits more deeply in terms of complementarity, 
temporality, scale, actors, and incumbency. It concludes with more general insights for 
energy and climate research, and policy. 
2. Defining co-benefits, case selection and research design 
 As a starting point, this section defines and conceptualizes co-benefits, justifies our 
four cases, introduces our mixed methods research design, and identifies limitations and 
shortcomings with our approach.  
2.1 Defining and conceptualizing co-benefits 
 Co-benefits, or “co-impacts” in the context of low carbon transitions, in the broadest 
and simplest sense refer to “the positive and negative side effects of mitigation policies and 
technologies” (Ürge-Vorsatz et al. 2014: 551).  But this simplicity belies a complex array of 
assumptions and dimensions to co-benefits.  Table 1, for example, illustrates the twenty three 
different terms used interchangeably with the term “co-benefits” identified by a recent 
review (Floater et al. 2016).  Not even the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
has offered a consistent conceptualization of co-benefits in its own reports, with earlier 
assessments defining co-benefits as “benefits that are intended by the policymaker” but 
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separating “ancillary benefits” as “unintended benefits” but merging them together in its 
latest 2014 assessment (Floater et al. 2016: 13-14).  
 
Table 1: Terms used to describe the co-benefits of climate change mitigation in the literature 
No. Term 
1 Win-win situations 
2 Life-cycle benefits 
3 Triple-win scenarios 
4 Consequential benefits 
5 Ancillary benefits 
6 Mutual benefits 
7 Consequential life cycle impacts 
8 Secondary benefits 
9 Induced changes 
10 Collateral benefits 
11 Side benefits 
12 Associated benefits 
13 Spill-over benefits 
14 Alignment of incentives/objectives 
15 Mainstreaming 
16 No-regret strategies 
17 Co-priorities 
18 Co-control 
19 Synergistic objectives 
20 Leverage points 
21 Co-incidence of agendas 
22 Externalities 
23 Coupled systems 
Source: Modified from Floater et al. (2016). 
 
Furthermore, such co-benefits can differ meaningfully in their intentionality, scope, 
and scale (Floater et al. 2016).  The intentionality of a co-benefit refers to whether it is 
pursued actively as a primary, secondary, or integrated objective, or whether it occurs 
accidentally and unintentionally.  The scope of a co-benefit relates to whether it occurs via 
climate change mitigation (stopping emissions), climate change adaptation (building 
resilience to the impacts of climate change), or both.  The scale of a co-benefit relates to the 
sectors or stakeholders accruing the benefit, and how they may differ temporally (near-term 
vs. long-term) and geography (local vs. national vs. global).  Co-benefits can also sit alongside 
costs or adverse consequences, with the IPCC noting that “a government policy or a measure 
intended to achieve one objective (such as mitigation) will also affect other objectives (such 
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as local air quality) … to the extent these side-effects are positive, they can be deemed ‘co-
benefits’; otherwise they are termed ‘adverse side-effects’” (Edenhofer et al. 2014: TS.11). 
Ürge-Vorsatz et al. (2014) offer an authoritative review of the climate change co-
benefits or co-impacts literature, and note that better documenting of co-benefits can help 
reveal some of the equity considerations often implicit or ignored in climate policy, especially 
tensions between current and future generations.  Co-benefits also serve as entry points for 
mobilizing climate action by providing a focal point for groups advocating for climate policies. 
This may be especially true when the benefits from climate mitigation can translate into 
trillions of dollars of avoided damages, or significant welfare gains to households, firms, and 
even nations (Burke et al. 2018; Noel et al. 2018; Alberni et al. 2018; Sovacool et al. 2017; 
Achtnicht 2011).  The IPCC itself categorizes co-benefits into the three classes of “economic,” 
“social,” and “environmental” shown in Table 2 (Edenhofer et al. 2014).   
Table 2: Overview of potential co-benefits to climate change mitigation across energy supply, 
transport, and buildings  
 
Sector Economic co-benefits Social co-benefits Environmental co-
benefits 




(reduced exposure to 
fuel price volatility) 
 
Local employment 
impact (but uncertain 
net effect) 




Health impact via 
decreased coal 
mining accidents  
Ecosystem impact 
via reduced air 
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(resource sufficiency, 
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reduced air pollution 
(except bioenergy) 
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via decreased coal 
mining  
 
Decreased water use 
(for wind and solar) 







in of human and 
physical capital in the 







(potential to use gas 
in some cases) 
Health impact via 
reduced air pollution 
 
Occupational safety 
and coal mines  
Ecosystem impact 
via reduced air 
pollution  
Transport    
Reduction of fuel 
carbon intensity via 
electricity, 
hydrogen, biofuel, 









spillovers (e.g. battery 
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consumer electronics) 
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urban pollution (net 
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reduced noise 




Ecosystem impact of 
electricity and 
hydrogen via urban 






exposure to price 
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Health impact via 
reduced noise 
(electricity and fuel 
cells especially) 
 





via reduced urban 
air pollution  
Compact urban 













Health impact for 
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modes via increased 




via urban air 
pollution 
Modal shift Employment 
opportunities in the 
public transport 
sector vs. car 
manufacturing  
Noise (modal shift 





via decreased land 
use competition  







Road safety via 
infrastructure for 
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women and children 
(for cookstoves) 
Health impact in 
residential buildings 
via outdoor air 
pollution, indoor air 








(for green roofs) 













Lower need for 
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Asset values of 
buildings 
 
Disaster resilience  
Fuel poverty (for 
retrofits and efficient 
equipment) 
 





Productive time for 




Health impact via air 










(less outdoor air 
pollution) 
 










Lower need for 
energy subsidies  
 Health impact via 








(less outdoor air 
pollution) 
Source: Modified from Edenhofer et al. (2014).  Note: the original IPCC report also lists co-
benefits of mitigation for industry and managing land use change and forestry, but these are 
not included in the paper as none of our cases involve forestry, only energy, transport, and 
(to a degree) buildings.  The IPCC also listed co-costs, which are not reported in the table, and 
a section on “Other,” which is also not reported.   
 
As Table 2 indicates, beyond economic and climatic benefits that may result from a 
reduced dependency on increasingly expensive and scarce non-renewable resources, a 
growing body of literature suggests that (quantifiable) improvements in health metrics are 
another substantial co-benefit of low carbon pathways. The IPCC working group on 
adaptation argues that the health co-benefits from low carbon infrastructure include fewer 
deaths from heat waves and forest fires, better food security, and improved curtailment of 
disease epidemics (Smith et al. 2014). Balbus et al. (2014) quantify these as representing $40 
to $198 of positive health value per metric ton of carbon dioxide mitigated by 2020. Rafai et 
al. (2013) analyzed the co-benefits of pursuing a global mitigation strategy to keep 
temperatures rises below 2°C, and found that under a strong deployment of clean and green 
energy (an aggressive emission mitigation strategy), expenditures on air pollution control 
would fall by €250 billion in 2050. Moreover, the study highlighted significant improvements 
in human health and average life expectancy because of these policy initiatives. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) similarly estimated in 2015 the cost of air pollution and 
associated health and economic damage that can be used to illustrate “avoided costs” when 
fossil fuels are replaced by clean energy (Coady et al. 2015: 2). The amount monetized was 
staggering: $5.3 trillion, or 6.5% of global GDP, with the largest subsidies in absolute terms in 
China ($2.3 trillion), the United States ($699 billion), and Russia ($335 billion). This has been 
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confirmed in comparative assessments of wind energy versus natural gas (McCubbin and 
Sovacool 2013). Lastly, the World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that if half of the 
global households that still use traditional fuels and stoves switched to cleaner cooking 
sources, over a ten-year period, families would save $34 billion per year and generate an 
economic return of $105 billion per year (United Nations Development Program 2013).  
Indeed, scholars from other fields have conceptualized the co-benefits of policy 
choices as existing across many different dimensions. For Miyatsuka and Zusman (2010), co-
benefits can be direct or indirect, as well as monetary or nonmonetary. They conceptualize 
“Level 1” co-benefits as those that are roughly proportional to the amount of investment 
made in targeting that policy change, such as jobs or improvements to health. “Level 2” co-
benefits are more abstract and need not always be tied to the scale of investment and can 
relate to dimensions such as achieving energy security or independence from particular 
imports. “Level 3” co-benefits can refer to multiplier benefits that are interlinked with many 
causal factors and are not easy to quantify, such as enhancements to democracy or social 
status.  Similarly, Creutzig et al. (2014) note the importance of non-quantifiable co-benefits 
such as the stabilization of the Eurozone as a possible co-benefit to climate change 
mitigation.   When these disparate types, levels, and dimensions of potential co-benefits are 
“seen” in analysis, low carbon transitions can be recognized as delivering other net benefits 
to society such as entrepreneurship, resilience, and collectiveness. 
2.2 Case study selection  
Acknowledging that low-carbon transitions can lead to a holistic array of co-benefits, 
cases were selected to represent a European or world leader in two sets of low carbon 
technologies, two supply oriented (nuclear power, solar PV) and two demand/end-use 
oriented (EVs, smart meters). The cases also portray different timescales in terms of initiation 
(nuclear power in the 1970s, EVs in the 1990s, solar PV in 2000s, and smart meters in the 
2010s), as Figure 1 indicates. 
Figure 1: European low carbon energy transitions nuclear power (France), solar energy 
(Germany), smart meters (Great Britain), and electric vehicles (Norway)  
 
a. Nuclear energy in the French electricity mix  
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d. Smart meter installations in Great Britain  
 




Source: Authors’ compilation of most recent data from the International Energy Agency (for 
Norway and France), Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi) for Germany, 
and the Department for Energy Business & Industrial Strategy for Great Britain. 
 
France was chosen because it has a strong history of state-led nuclear power 
development that has made it a European leader for decades (Hecht 1988; Jasper 1992; 
Finon and Staropoli 2001; Sovacool and Valentine 2012). France relied on nuclear power 
plants for 4% of their national electricity supply in 1970 but currently receives about 75% of 
its electricity from nuclear power—the highest share of any major economy in the world—
and comes second, after the United States, in its total number of reactors with 58 (compared 
to 104 in the United States) (World Nuclear Association 2018). It is the largest global exporter 
of nuclear electricity, transmitting 18% of its total production to Belgium, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, generating more than €3 billion in annual revenue. 
France is also one of the world’s largest recyclers of nuclear fuel, with 17% of national 
electricity coming from reprocessed fuel rods (World Nuclear Association 2018). The French 
nuclear power program has therefore been hailed as “a success story” that has placed the 
country “ahead of the world” at building nuclear reactors and generating nuclear electricity 
(Weaver 2008: 12). 
 Germany was selected because it has one of the highest total per capita capacities of 
solar PV installed anywhere in the world, with 43,000 MW installed at the end of 2017, 
providing 7.2 % of gross national supply (Fraunhofer ISE, 2018).  This means that, strikingly, 
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41% of Europe’s solar PVs are installed in Germany, with the next closest country (Italy) 
having only 19% of the EU market (German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy 
2017). A substantial number of these solar PV installations are not large-scale ‘solar farms’ 
but are distributed across homes and businesses, with Wittenberg and Matthies (2016) 
reporting that more than 1.5 million residential households own their own German system to 
take advantage of the country’s feed-in tariff.  
 Norway was selected because it is the world leader in the per capita deployment of 
battery-powered electric vehicles, or EVs.  The International Energy Agency (2018) notes 
that, thanks to Norway, the Nordic region saw the total stock of EVs reach 250,000 cars by 
the end of 2017, meaning that the region accounted for 8% of the global total, the third-
largest share after China and the United States. The per capita diffusion of EVs across the 
Nordic region is the highest in the world at 10.6%; the growth rate the highest in the world 
(up 57% from the previous year); and Norway saw EVs representing 39% of annual new car 
sales (International Energy Agency 2018).  As Ryghaug and Toftaker (2014: 146) write, 
“Norway is one of the world’s leading electric car societies where the transition to electric 
road transport is most advanced, with many more electric cars than any other European 
country.” 
 Finally, Great Britain was selected because of its aggressive national smart meters 
program—which will install digital meters that can track consumption instantaneously for 
electricity and natural gas—that began to be rolled out across England, Scotland, and Wales 
in 2016.  This program, formally known as the Smart Meter Implementation Program (SMIP), 
lays the legal foundation to offer every home and business a smart meter by the end of 2020. 
It represents the British government’s “flagship energy policy” and involves installing more 
than 50 million meters at a cost of at least £11 billion (Sovacool et al. 2017: 768). Although 
the expected costs and benefits of the rollout are debated, Lewis and Kerr (2014: 3) have 
argued that the SMIP is “by far the most complex” and also the “costliest” smart meter 
program in the world, as well as the largest government-run information technology project 
in history. Smart Energy Great Britain, the “voice” of the smart meter roll-out, framed it as 
“the biggest behavioral change program that this country has seen” and “the biggest national 
infrastructure project in our lifetimes” (House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee, 2016: 13). The Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS, 
2018) reported that 10.8 million smart meters were installed as of March 2018, 
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corresponding to about 19% of the target number of 56 million. This makes Great Britain an 
obvious frontrunner in the deployment of smart meters. 
2.3 Mixed methods research design  
 With our cases selected, we proceeded with a qualitative research design that mixed 
methods across three approaches: semi-structured research interviews with experts, to 
obtain expert opinion; five focus groups in non-capital areas, to obtain public opinion; and 
the monitoring of twelve internet forums (three per country), to solicit public opinion beyond 
the somewhat limited scope of the focus groups.   
 We conducted 64 interviews, 16 per country, and sought to obtain a diverse mix of 
data from across academic institutions, non-profit organizations and civil society groups, 
government departments (including independent regulators), think tanks, and industry 
(including trade bodies and financial institutions) in the summer and fall of 2018 (see the data 
tables in Appendix I). In each interview, we asked (among other questions): “What do you see 
as the most significant benefits or advantages to the energy transition being examined?” The 
research interviews generally lasted between thirty and ninety minutes, were digitally 
recorded, and participants were guaranteed anonymity to protect their identity and 
encourage candor.  
 To supplement our expert interviews with public perceptions, we conducted five 
focus groups in non-capital areas of each country, namely Lewes (GB), Colmar (France), 
Freiburg (Germany), and Stavanger (Norway) with a total of 15 participants, summarized also 
in Appendix I. The justification for focus groups was to solicit input from non-expert 
stakeholders, given that focus groups and interviews work well together, but are not 
substitutes.  Interviews tend to reveal more private, in-depth opinions, whereas focus groups 
reveal more public attitudes and consensus values (Kaplowitz and Hoehn 2001; Gailing and 
Naumann 2018).  Admittedly, our focus groups were on the small side, with two to six 
participants each, whereas Citizens Advice (2015) suggests an optimal size of 6 to 8 
respondents and O’Nyumba et al. (2018) report a common size of 3 to 21 participants. 
However, Morgan (2012) emphasizes in particular the value of smaller 2 to 3 person focus 
groups, for being more intimate and having a better group dynamic, which we certainly 
found to be the case in our research design and implementation.  
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 Lastly, to triangulate our interviews and focus groups, we posted research questions 
on online internet forums, three per country, to solicit public input beyond the focus groups.  
Collectively, these forums had almost 2.1 million members that we could identify (see 
Appendix I for more details). For each case study, we asked: “What are the biggest 
advantages of low carbon innovations such as smart meters, EVs, solar PV, or nuclear?  Who 
are the big recipients of those benefits or winners?” This resulted in 58 additional responses.   
 After collection of the interview, focus group, and internet forum data, all audio and 
textual data were transcribed, with each respondent given a unique identifying number. All 
transcripts were then coded by two researchers. Our coding scheme was exhaustive and 
inductive, meaning we coded every response and then analyzed the full sample using NVIVO. 
 Our research design is meant to be seen as a complement, rather than a full 
substitute, to alternative approaches such as those using hedonic prices and willingness to 
pay research designs. These alternative approaches, while useful, have been critiqued for 
estimation biases whereby respondents overstate the amount they are willing to pay or 
contribute, or struggle to convert different preferences into monetary terms (Thampapillai 
2002).  Soderholm and Sundqvist (2003) add that willingness to pay methods do not work 
well when priorities or goals conflict, when a particular topic is multifunctional or 
multidimensional, or when it can provide a complex array of goods and services difficult to 
predict and monetize. This certainly seems to be the case with climate co-benefits, and so we 
selected a set of methods that would not overly restrict respondents and artificially narrow 
the resulting discussion.  
2.4 Limitations  
 Despite an attempt to holistically conceive of co-benefits, and at triangulation within 
its research design, our approach does have some notable limitations.   
 Firstly, most rigorous co-benefit analyses, especially quantitative assessments, 
evaluate a co-benefit against a well-defined counterfactual. If looking at the provision of 
renewable electricity, for instance, a co-benefit study would evaluate that provision against a 
counterfactual of coal-fired power, which is how the IPCC has done it in their catalogue in 
Table 2 (above).  Given that we asked respondents about benefits (which could be perceived, 
potential, or prospective), rather than those established by a consistent counterfactual 
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analysis, our analysis is more qualitative and sometimes lacks any explicit baseline or 
alternative for a specific co-benefit.  
Secondly, our study examines co-benefits but not adverse side effects or costs.  This is 
rooted in the research question we asked—overtly about “benefits or advantages”—and it 
means we do not discuss possible mitigation costs alongside benefits, or barriers.  Yet, as 
Edenhofer et al. (2014) convincingly argue, mitigation costs represent an important 
component of considering the relationship between climate change mitigation and human 
welfare, and such costs can be expressed in terms of changes in economic activity, 
consumption losses, compensating variation, and loss in consumer or producer surpluses. 
This is why much of the literature uses the term “co-impacts” rather than “co-benefits,” as it 
encompasses co-costs, lifecycle impacts, or ancillary impacts, alongside positive aspects 
(Floater et al. 2016).  Ürge-Vorsatz et al. (2014) even offer a helpful schematic diagram in 
Figure 2 showing positive and negative co-impacts to climate action, alongside intentional 
and unintentional consequences.  Our study only assesses half of this typology, by focusing 
on what Ürge-Vorsatz et al. (2014) would call intentional and unintentional positive impacts 
(in the top half of the diagram).  Moreover, by focusing only on co-benefits, we do not 
explore the likely barriers facing climate policy or action, and which could very well impede 
the realization or fair distribution of such benefits, such as market barriers and market 
failures (Brown 2001), path dependence and lock-in (Brown et al. 2007), the mobilization of 
finance (Polzin 2017), and patterns of incumbency that resist change (Geels 2012), to name a 
few. 
Figure 2: A typology of positive and negative vs. intentional and unintentional co-benefits and 
co-impacts  
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Source: Ürge-Vorsatz et al. (2014: 555) 
 
Thirdly, in terms of data collection, although the focus groups and internet forums 
were open to all members of the public, the number of responses collected was less than 
that of the expert interviews.  Moreover, due to the wealth of empirical material spread 
across four case studies, we did not have sufficient space in this study to also assess barriers, 
or disadvantages, or to conduct a rigorous literature review to confirm our findings.  We do, 
however, examine whole systems injustices and negative justice externalities affiliated with 
the four transitions in a separate paper. We also did not make an attempt to weight, correct, 
normalize, or problematize data across our methods, to avoid censoring our results and 
discussion.  
3. Results: Beyond cost and carbon in the co-benefits of low carbon energy 
 Overall, our mixed methods results produced a total of 128 benefits that we 
inductively placed in technical, economic, political, social, and environmental dimensions. By 
technical, we refer to benefits such as efficiency and performance improvements, innovation 
dynamics, and knowledge and skills development. By economic, we refer to benefits 
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including affordable energy services, revenues for stakeholders (including users and 
investors), and jobs. By political, we refer to benefits such as policy learning, enhanced 
energy security, and building political capital via meeting campaign pledges and promises. By 
social, we refer to improvements in comfort, prestige, identity, awareness, and lifestyle. By 
environmental, we mean benefits in terms of reduced air pollution, mitigation of emissions, 
water, and other aspects of the natural world.   
Admittedly, these categories interrelate. As just one example, improvements in 
technical performance and patterns of positive innovation (which we classify as technical) 
also intersect with the types of energy goods and services being provided, and market 
structure (which many might classify as economic).  We sidestepped this issue by simply 
classifying co-benefits on the terms and phrases used by our respondents. In this section, we 
elaborate further on the context-specific articulations of these benefits by each national case 
study, conducting frequency counts to determine benefits that recurred within the 
interviews. Then, in Section 4, we discuss more critically the issues that cut across these 
cases, offering some new theorizations of ‘co-benefits’ – as observable phenomena that may 
have under-acknowledged synergetic, temporal, spatial, social, and disruptive dimensions.  
3.1 Nuclear power in France  
Our data led to the cataloging of 30 co-benefits in total to nuclear power in France, 
the most mentioned dimensions being technical (9) and economic (9), followed by social (5), 
environmental (4) and political (3). Table 3 offers an overview of these findings, as well as the 
frequency by which they occurred across our methods.  
Table 3: Identified co-benefits to the French nuclear power transition  
No. Type Benefit Supported bya Frequencyb 
1 Economic Cheap electricity for France  RI 10 
2 Environmental Low carbon energy source  RI, IF 10 
3 Economic Created well-paid and stable jobs in nuclear industry RI 9 
4 Political Secured energy independence and energy security, 
reduced fossil fuel imports   
RI, IF 7 
5 Social Supported egalitarian energy access RI 7 
6 Social Galvanized pride in national project RI 6 
7 Economic Supported industrial growth RI, FG 6 
8 Technical Facilitated nationwide electrification and heating RI 5 
9 Political Supported articulation of national power RI 5 
10 Economic Cheap electricity for neighbors and profitable 
exports 
RI 4 
11 Social Enabled social investments in peripheral regions RI 4 
12 Environmental A safe form of energy with risks well managed RI 4 
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13 Technical Developed France's nuclear industry expertise RI 4 
14 Technical Provides large baseload generation RI 4 
15 Economic Sustained péréquation tarifaire RI 4 
16 Economic Low variable costs per kwh RI 3 
17 Economic Nuclear energy export revenue  RI, FG 3 
18 Technical Supported broader technological and industrial 
innovation 
RI 2 
19 Technical Supports EU interconnection RI 2 
20 Technical Complementary to renewable integration RI 2 
21 Political Complemented France's political system RI 2 
22 Technical   Generated technical and best practice expertise and 
knowledge for transfer 
RI 2 
23 Environmental Enabled France to phase out other carbon energies RI 2 
24 Environmental Cleaner local air RI 1 
25 Social Raising industry working standards RI 1 
26 Technical Providing re-processing facilities for other countries RI 1 
27 Technical Facilitated time of use system RI 1 
28 Economic Low cost of decommissioning RI 1 
29 Social  Increase in thermal and home comfort  FG - 
30 Economic Profitable returns for shareholders and investors IF - 
Source: Authors. Note: aRI=research interview.  FG=focus group.  IF=internet forum. bFrequency 
counts conducted only for the interviews, as the focus groups and internet forums did not have a 
fixed number of respondents.   
 
 The most frequently mentioned category of technical benefits included aspects such 
as broader industrial innovation, the building up of nuclear skills and capacity, and the 
development of a technically robust national network of electricity and heat provision. From 
a technical perspective, the broad development of nuclear energy established a French 
engineering expertise that became envied and exported worldwide (benefits 13 and 22), but 
also supported a broad national project of electrification and heating – creating innovations 
such as ‘time of use’ tariffing (benefits 8 and 27). These developments all had strong social 
benefits, as many newly-built households benefitted from improved thermal comfort that 
electrical heating brought. For some interviewees, such innovations – despite the claims that 
nuclear energy ‘locks in’ states technically to a nuclear (and centralized) path-dependence – 
put France at an advantage today as its broad electrification could potentially support other 
low carbon innovations such as electric vehicles and renewable energy integration (benefit 
20).  
 The second most frequently mentioned category of economic benefits emphasized 
aspects such as cheap electricity for France (which has undoubtedly served as a backbone for 
economic growth and industrialization, as Figure 3 underscores), high-paying jobs, and cheap 
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electricity for countries bordering France. Most expert interviewees recognized that, 
although electricity prices had risen in recent years, all French citizens had historically 
enjoyed the benefits of the nuclear transition in the form of cheap electricity (benefit 1). As 
F003 reasoned: 
For people, electricity has been really affordable, and it has been a national business, 
so prices were decided politically. Nuclear really allowed us to develop French 
industries, and having access to cheap electricity has been very good for the 
development of the economy, as energy is life. Yes, it has been a choice, but that 
choice has been a main positive benefit. 
F012 estimated that because of nuclear power, Électricité de France (EDF), the state-owned 
utility, is able to employ 100,000 to 200,000 jobs necessary in managing the grid. The industrial 
and manufacturing sector was said to have also benefitted from cheap electricity, and nuclear 
energy supported a joined-up industrial strategy throughout the 1960s and 1970s that 
presided over the construction of the national railway network, as well as supporting the 
development of private French firms (benefits 7 and 18). 
Figure 3: The Solvay/Butachimie industry platform in Chalampé, France, served partly by the 
Fessenheim nuclear power plant, July 2018  
 
 
Source: Authors  
 Socially, nuclear power in France was acclaimed for bringing egalitarian energy access, 
galvanizing national pride, and raising industrial working standards. Because of the 
standardized national tariff, the péréquation tarifaire, all households across France have 
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enjoyed (and continue to enjoy) an equally low rate of electricity, regardless of their 
remoteness or rurality (benefit 8). F014 summarizes this link: 
There is the péréquation tarifaire, which is a cross-subsidy for rural users. This 
represents a conscious attempt to level prices. And there were measures to minimize 
inequalities in terms of cost and access to energy … the idea is to make sure everyone 
pays the same. 
F004 also highlighted this link:  
One positive takeaway from the French nuclear program was the link made from the 
beginning between a technical option and public service policy. It was about a concern 
of social justice from the beginning. 
While nuclear energy may not be directly responsible for such a development, it undoubtedly 
helped France to sustain such a policy through the provision of massive baseload generation 
(benefit 14). 
From an environmental perspective, the existence of the nuclear program was 
strongly credited with securing relatively low levels of C02 emissions within France’s 
electricity generation (benefit 2). As F013 described:  
Nuclear is clearly a low carbon technology, whatever perspective you take. On 
operation, it doesn’t emit C02. If you consider the whole lifecycle assessment, it is 
probably with wind and hydro, the lowest carbon footprint you could imagine. Solar 
emits much more CO2 if you consider the whole lifetime.  
As well as benefitting France, this contributes to global emissions reductions: indeed, 
according to an EC JRC and PBL (2015) report, France had the lowest CO2 emissions per 
capita within the OECD as of 2014. On a local level within France, respondents noted how a 
broad “low carbon” electricity baseload also secured cleaner air, benefitting public health 
and the local environment (benefit 24), particularly as the development of nuclear energy 
enabled the phasing out of other “dirtier” energy production sources, such as coal (benefit 
23).  
Politically, the benefits of the nuclear transition were regarded as strongly accruing to 
the centralized state, for which nuclear energy was considered a perfect complement 
(benefits 9 and 21). F002 even went as far as to claim that nuclear energy had become 
central to France’s identity as a country, providing it with a source of national pride and 
patriotism in the second half of the twentieth century:  
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Nuclear energy locked into a sense of nationhood and pride in engineering, which is 
also linked into the military aspects of the program, which themselves were the result 
of feelings of shame or disempowerment during World War II. Out of that conflict 
emerged a sense of needing a place at the table and an articulation of national power. 
More practically, as well as the vast numbers of jobs created within (and around) the plants 
themselves, the nuclear industry reinforced and secured the future of the cadre of trained 
specialists (such as engineers and economists) within the Corps des Mines in Paris, who 
continue to administer the nuclear program (benefit 3). Finally, some interviewees 
considered that the energy independence that France had gained through the existence of its 
nuclear energy source had also minimized its vulnerability to external price shocks and its 
need to engage in risky commercial and military foreign activities in order to secure supplies 
of oil and gas (benefit 4).   
3.2 Solar PV in Germany  
Our respondents identified 30 distinct benefits to solar energy in Germany, the most 
popular category being economic (9) followed by political (6), social (6), technical (6) and 
environmental (3), as summarized in Table 4.  
Table 4: Identified co-benefits to the German solar energy transition 
No. Type Benefit Supported bya Frequencyb 
1 Economic Created new businesses and jobs in 
manufacturing 
RI, FG 13 
2 Environmental Emissions reductions RI, FG, IF 12 
3 Social Enables citizen energy democracy RI, FG 12 
4 Economic Profitable for investors RI 12 
5 Economic Has reduced costs for PV RI, IF 9 
6 Political More decentralization RI, FG 8 
7 Technical Development of German innovation RI 8 
8 Economic Created a PV market RI 7 
9 Social Generating awareness in renewables RI, FG 7 
10 Social Participation in policy RI 6 
11 Economic Reduced electricity costs RI, FG, IF 5 
12 Political Lessons about transitions RI, FG 5  
13 Political  Minimizes dependence on fossil fuels RI, FG 5 
14 Technical Learning by doing RI 4 
15 Economic Easy process for installers RI 3 
16 Environmental Does not impact on landscape as much as 
some other technologies 
RI, FG 3 
17 Political National energy independence RI 3 
18 Political People achieving autonomy RI 3 
19 Technical Creation of decentralized producers RI 3 
20 Economic Made use of farm land and other land RI 2 
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21 Economic Surplus energy production being exported RI 2 
22 Economic Tax revenue from solar users RI 1 
23 Technical  Demonstrated feasibility RI 2 
24 Political Energy leadership opportunity RI, FG 1 
25 Social Domestic comfort FG, IF - 
26 Social Health benefits RI 1 
27 Social Protects rural communities RI 1 
28 Technical Better EU interconnection RI 1 
29 Technical Facilitating move to renewables RI 1 
30 Environmental  Making use of natural endowments for 
energy 
FG - 
Source: Authors. Note: aRI=research interview.  FG=focus group.  IF=internet forum. bFrequency 
counts conducted only for the interviews, as the focus groups and internet forums did not have a 
fixed number of respondents.   
 
The most frequently mentioned economic benefits of solar PV in Germany were the 
creation of new businesses and jobs in manufacturing (benefit 1) and the fact that solar PV is 
profitable for investors, whether small or large-scale (benefit 4). At the height of Germany’s 
solar PV industry in 2012, one respondent claimed that the sector had approximately 120,000 
jobs1 (G004).  The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) (2018) reports that global 
renewable energy employment reached 10.3 million jobs in 2017, and that it was 
approximately 325,000 jobs in Germany overall, a slight increase from the earlier year, 
although it noted that it was the wind industry, not the solar industry, dominating jobs.  For 
example, IRENA (2018) estimated that the 160,100 people working in Germany’s wind energy 
industry equaled the number of employees in the next ten largest European countries 
combined. 
The current German wind industry contrasts sharply with the German solar industry. 
While many of its jobs were lost following cuts to the feed-in-tariff (FIT) in 2012, the sector 
retained approximately 36,000 jobs as of 2016 (G013) and it continues to manufacture the 
technical machinery that is exported for use in the global production of panels. Things may get 
more optimistic in the future, with Lehr et al. (2012) projecting that gross employment in the 
German renewable energy sector will increase from 340,000 in 2009 to 600,000 by 2030. 
Implemented through the German Renewable Energy Sources Act of 2000, the FIT law 
has provided a long-term investment opportunity for investors, guaranteeing income for 20 
                                                 
1 Lütkenhorst and Pegels (2014) claim the number was nearer 90,000. 
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years (G010). The generous support of the FIT also resulted in another economic benefit, 
reduced costs for PV (benefit 5), which ultimately enabled Germany to create a domestic PV 
market (benefit 8), while also having a strong influence on both the development of innovation 
and the global PV market. As G014 noted: 
When you look back at the cost regression of solar panels, Germany contributed very 
much to bringing solar worldwide to the market. 
In this way the German transition is credited with lowering the cost of solar energy in multiple 
markets (G004). 
 Social benefits centered on aspects such as energy democracy, generating awareness, 
and domestic comfort. The wide acceptance of solar PV amongst the German public (a result 
of what many interviewees attributed to the initially economically very attractive nature of the 
value proposition) has led the technology itself to have significant impacts on the political 
landscape of German energy markets. Indeed, it has enabled greater decentralization (benefit 
6), and has enabled people to achieve a greater level of autonomy (benefit 18) through self-
supply by allowing them to move away from the dominant energy suppliers – a potentially 
disruptive long-term dynamic (Richter 2013). This trend has brought several social benefits, 
such as generating awareness in renewables (benefit 9) and widening participation in policy 
(benefit 10) beyond incumbent players. However, the most frequently mentioned social 
benefit of solar PV was the way it has enabled a broader energy democracy (benefit 3) by 
providing people not only with an opportunity to take part in the German energy transition but 
also to do so on their own terms. As G011 stated: 
I would say that the strengthening of democracy is a benefit of this transition to 
renewables, because we find that people are getting engaged in community projects, 
and when you read surveys about these projects, about why they participate in solar 
and wind projects, the motives vary and financial motives are an aspect but it is never 
the first. The biggest driver is that they want to do something good for the community, 
and that tells me that there is a wider benefit of democratization in society. That people 
are talking to each other and taking matters into their own hands. I think that is a big 
benefit that is overseen. The unique part of the process is the citizen-led nature of the 
transition. 
This community uptake of solar is illustrated in Figure 4, which shows a fairly large-scale solar 
system installed at a spa in Berlin. 
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Figure 4: A community solar PV installation at the Liquidrom Spa in Berlin, Germany, July 2018 
 
Source: Authors.  
Importantly, respondents underscored that Germany’s experience with solar PV can 
provide valuable policy lessons about transitions (benefit 12) to other countries, showing how 
a transition could work (G005) for other industrialized nations (G008). There are also 
implications for national energy independence (benefit 17), as there is the potential for 
minimizing dependence on fossil fuels (benefit 13) in countries that rely mostly on imports of 
coal and gas for its electricity generation sources.  
  Technical benefits mentioned by respondents include the development of German 
innovation, learning by doing, and better connection with the European Union. Early market 
creation, especially before 2005, was built on the success of developing German innovation 
(benefit 7), notably in the manufacturing of solar panels which “survived and thrived and 
drove technology in part because it was close to the application” (G001), enabling learning by 
doing (benefit 14) as the technology and industry matured.  
 Lastly, respondents suggested that solar PV has brought environmental benefits to 
Germany in terms of emissions reductions (benefit 2) from increased use of renewable 
energy. Further, G008 discussed how solar brings benefits by enabling Germany to phase out 
nuclear, noting that “beneficiaries or winners could be kids in the vicinity of nuclear power 
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reactors or people who live in the vicinity of a nuclear waste dump, or anybody who’s just not 
happy trains of nuclear waste running through the country.”  While renewable energy is 
generally popular in Germany (G014), solar PV especially is widely accepted given that solar 
PV installations do not impact on landscape as much as some other technologies such as 
wind, nuclear, or coal (benefit 16).  
3.3 Electric vehicles (EVs) in Norway 
 Our original material led to the identification of 26 benefits associated with 
Norwegian EVs, led by economic (8) and social (7) and followed by technical (4), 
environmental (4), and political (3). Table 5 offers a summary.  
Table 5: Identified co-benefits to the Norwegian electric vehicle transition  
 
No. Type Benefit Supported bya Frequencyb 
1 Environmental Emissions reductions, climate change RI, IF 16 
2 Economic Provision of concessions for owners RI 12 
3 Environmental Air quality RI 12 
4 Technical Demonstrating technology to others, 
stimulating innovation  
RI, FG 10 
5 Environmental Noise reduction RI 9 
6 Political  Developing policy learning and 
innovation, a model for others 
RI, FG 8 
7 Social Convenience of special rules, exceptions, 
saving travel time 
RI, IF 5 
8 Economic Save money on fossil transport fuels RI, IF 4 
9 Economic Encourages other private companies to 
enter the EV market 
RI 3 
10 Social Enjoyable to use, comfortable to drive RI, FG, IF 3 
11 Political Political objective on take-up met RI 3 
12 Economic Export revenues from cars, parts sales RI 2 
13 Social Stimulating greater environmental 
awareness 
RI, FG 2 
14 Social Good for conscience  RI, FG 2 
15 Technical A good use of abundant electricity 
production 
RI 2 
16 Economic Complementary companies benefitting 
from provision of EV infrastructure 
RI 1 
17 Economic Electricity providers seeing higher 
demand 
RI 1 
18 Economic EVs keep their value RI 1 
19 Political Contributing to energy security and 
independence by minimizing need for oil 
RI, FG 1 
20 Social Safer environment RI 1 
21 Economic Enables cheaper car access and use FG - 
22 Environmental  Leverages Norway’s green and renewable 
electricity production 
FG - 
23 Social Freedom of movement  IF - 
24 Technical More efficient conversion of energy, 
reduced fossil fuel usage 
FG - 




Source: Authors. Note: aRI=research interview.  FG=focus group.  IF=internet forum. bFrequency 
counts conducted only for the interviews, as the focus groups and internet forums did not have a 
fixed number of respondents. 
 
The economic benefits cited by respondents included aspects such as saving money on 
fuel, the fact that EVs retain their financial value, and export revenues from the sales of cars 
and parts (benefits 8, 18 and 12). Twelve interviewees mentioned the provision of concessions 
for owners as key for those purchasing EVs (benefit 2). Indeed, EVs are presently exempt from 
purchase tax (calculated for each car depending on emissions and weight of the car) and value 
added tax (VAT is 25%). In addition to tax concessions, EV users also benefit from free charging, 
reduced rates on toll roads and ferries, and free parking. As N012 stated: 
There are multiple taxes that EV owners do not pay, VAT, purchase tax. I think you could 
say an expensive Tesla should have cost about 40-50% more with normal taxes, so it 
adds up to significant money. Still with free parking, reduced costs on the roads. They 
get a lot of money. 
These benefits are especially relevant to urban dwellers living close to the major cities of Oslo 
and Bergen, where EVs were initially seen as the wealthier person’s car of choice, as N010 
remarked: 
An abundance of rich single men with 2 or 3 cars, at least at the beginning, they were 
the winners. 
Admittedly, following the development of smaller and cheaper cars by makers such as Nissan 
and BMW, a wider population of Norwegians have been able to afford EVs, with N003 noting 
that “they are (now) bought by any type of people, I don’t think there is a strong social 
dimension to it here in Norway” (N003). This perception was underscored in the focus group 
and internet forums, where it was emphasized that certain high-end brands were actually now 
more affordable in Norway in their EV versions, with Figure 5 showing an affordable model 
from Renault.  Further illustrating this point, in the focus group, a respondent stated: “I could 
never have afforded a regular BMW, but the EV is half the price.” And in the internet forums, a 
respondent exclaimed: “I almost get a heart attack when I have to use a fossil car, and then 
see the price for tanking (both in Norway and abroad).” 
Figure 5: A Renault Twizy Electric Vehicle in Oslo, June, 2018  
25 Technical Improved reliability, fewer parts to go 
wrong 
IF - 
26 Social Prestige, a fashion statement FG -  
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Source: Authors  
 Social benefits included the fact that EVs are enjoyable, comfortable, and prestigious 
to own and drive (benefit 10), as well as the fact their wider diffusion sends signals to others 
that one is ‘green’ or ‘environmentally aware’. N003 captured these sentiments about the 
experiential and emotional dimensions associated with owning and driving an EV: 
Anyone who has an EV feels it is a better car, just more comfortable for the driver. That 
comes in addition to the environmental benefits. It is smoother, responds better to your 
signals, can drive as slow as you like or it accelerates easily, you have better control. 
Most people I know who have bought an EV say “Oh! It is so nice to drive.” It works very 
quietly, compared to a traditional car with gears. If you drive in traffic jams, new cars 
have these anyway, but it is easy to stay in EV as easy to regulate distance due to the 
response. 
Social benefits were also mentioned in the focus groups, where respondents remarked on the 
role of EVs in raising environmental awareness, with one participant stating, “people become 
green after buying an EV”. Another participant added that “creating awareness is a big part of 
this” and that interest had expanded from small groups of environmentally-motivated 
‘pioneers’ to the wider public: “before it was more hippies and Greenpeace, but now awareness 
is broader”. Driving comfort was mentioned repeatedly in the focus group, with one participant 
saying that her EV was “a joy to drive”, while another highlighted that – especially in the early 
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days of the market – EVs also brought a social prestige: “EVs grew in Oslo as a fashion 
statement and as a more convenient way of traveling, in bus lanes” (benefit 26). Freedom of 
movement came up in the internet forums too, with one user observing that, as EVs had free 
access to bus lanes, users could enjoy more stress-free journeys: “it makes me less stressed, 
since I don’t have to worry if a lane will turn into a bus lane.”  Another noted that “EVs are easy 
to drive, very relaxing.” 
 The technical benefits mentioned by respondents emphasized aspects such as the way 
in which EV development has stimulated broader innovation and the fact that EVs are a good 
fit for the Norwegian energy sector’s technical base – where a large share of pumped-storage 
provides a clean and reliable basis of electricity. As N006 put it: 
We tend to look at Norway as kind of a technical laboratory, what happens if we roll 
out EVs on a huge scale. The different car manufacturers send delegations here all the 
time to see how we handle this. How we handle charging, how it works, how people 
use their cars.  
Respondents in the internet forums highlighted the fact that EVs are technically more 
straightforward and have better reliability than regular cars (benefit 25). One respondent 
mentioned that with EVs, there were “few things that can go wrong (less parts)”, while another 
highlighted that “home charging is really simple. The cars have few parts that one needs to 
worry about (clutch, timing belt, exhaust).”  Another exclaimed that after an EV, “I’ll never go 
back to fossil car … when you get used to instant torque and good acceleration you just don’t 
like the loud fossil engine struggling and screaming like a pig at full power.”  Others remarked 
that EVs have “a perfect drivetrain, no more slow and jerky gearboxes and start/stop systems, 
one-pedal driving is fantastic when you get used to it, I love having a full tank of electrons every 
morning;” “it is simply wonderful to drive an electric car, and passengers often marvel at how 
nice and smooth it feels”; and “using a fossil fueled car has become extremely unsatisfying. The 
motor annoys me considerably more now than before.” 
 The domain of environmental benefits from EVs encompassed aspects such as the role 
of EVs in mitigating climate change and in facilitating improvements in air quality and noise 
pollution (benefits 1, 3 and 5). Technical learning from the personal EV market was also seen 
as helping to expedite the electrification of other transport sectors, including buses, maritime 
and aviation. Emissions reductions from EVs were mentioned by all expert interviewees as a 
key environmental benefit. However, in addition to EVs contributing to emissions reductions 
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at both global and national levels, a more localized benefit related to improvements in air 
quality – particularly important given that Norwegian cities have serious problems with air 
quality, especially in the cold winter months. As N012 noted: 
Local air pollution is a huge driver for politicians promoting EV policies in cities like in 
Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim and so on. They have scores of air quality problems there. 
Taking out the nitrogen oxide is just as important as carbon dioxide in Norway. 
There are also benefits for city dwellers in terms of noise reduction, with N005 observing that 
“the noise level goes down, at least in cities when the speed is low”. 
 The final domain of benefits relates to political dimensions, such as the generation of 
political capital, the contributions to energy security, and the production of policy learning for 
other countries. Indeed, with respect to the first of these benefits, three interviewees 
mentioned that some of the key beneficiaries of the Norwegian EV story have in fact been 
politicians – as their political objective on EV take-up has been comfortably met, enabling them 
to garner praise (even as some respondents acknowledged that the policy success had been 
somewhat accidental and unexpected). As N004 stated: 
I am a bit proud actually of what we have done, because they set a goal and it has been 
a success. 
Policy success in Norway has also provided an opportunity for developing policy learning and 
innovation from the Norwegian case (benefit 6), with eight interviewees saying that Norway 
can act as an example for other countries who are interested in learning what does, and what 
does not, work in the development of an EV market and infrastructure. N005 especially 
highlighted that given the small size of Norway, “the Norwegian example shows that if the 
incentives are strong enough, it’s actually possible to see a large-scale electrification of the 
passenger car fleet.” Focus group participants also highlighted that EVs can bring political 
benefits, especially regarding energy independence:  
It’s also not just climate change, it’s about diversifying beyond the two forms of energy 
today that power 80% of the world, and avoiding energy being produced in areas where 
there is conflict. 
3.4 Smart meters in Great Britain 
Finally, our material led to the identification of 42 discernable benefits for smart 
meters in Great Britain. At the top of the list were social (12) and technical (12) benefits, 
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followed by economic (11), political (4) and environmental (3). Table 6 offers a summary of 
these benefits.   
Table 6: Identified co-benefits to the Great Britain smart meter transition  
No. Type Benefit Supported 
bya 
Frequencyb 
1 Economic Help households save money by identifying energy 
efficiency measures, controlling energy use 
RI, FG, IF 13 
2 Economic Help households save money by enabling time of use RI, IF 10 
3 Environmental Will facilitate more decarbonized energy system, 
integration of renewables 
RI, IF 11 
4 Environmental Will reduce overall energy usage RI, FG, IF 11 
5 Social Wider energy awareness and visibility RI, FG 11 
6 Technical Facilitates distributed generation RI 9 
7 Social Protects customers from shock or estimated bills RI 8 
8 Political Policy learning RI 8 
9 Technical Facilitates better demand management RI, IF 7 
10 Economic Cheaper grid costs  RI, IF 7 
11 Economic Generation of data that can be valuable RI, IF 7 
12 Technical Facilitates demand led energy system, innovation RI, IF 6 
13 Technical Facilitates a more efficient grid, grid security RI, IF 5 
14 Social Saves customers the inconvenience of reading meters RI 5 
15 Economic Generates new sources of profit RI 5 
16 Economic Saves money in meter reading and calls RI 4 
17 Political Offers consumer protection through transparency RI 4 
18 Social Makes it easier to pay bills RI 4 
19 Technical Enables smart appliances RI 4 
20 Technical Facilitates renewable integration RI, IF 4 
21 Environmental Reduces emissions from meter reading RI 3 
22 Social Enables the identification of vulnerability RI 3 
23 Social Protects consumers from losing power by enabling credit 
extension 
RI 3 
24 Economic Drives market competition RI 2 
25 Political Enable national energy independence RI 2 
26 Technical Facilitates nationwide and EU-wide grid integration RI 2 
27 Social Removes uncertainty around energy consumption RI 2 
28 Social Installation and tailored energy advice RI 2 
29 Economic Help households save money through automated 
switching 
RI 2 
30 Technical Facilitate EVs and storage RI 1 
31 Social Minimizes vulnerability created by blackouts RI 1 
32 Social Enables poorer households to consume more energy for 
no extra cost 
RI 1 
33 Political Policy success RI 1 
34 Technical  Enables smart homes RI 1 
35 Economic Drives a more cost-reflective energy system RI 1 
36 Economic Identify fraudulent use, theft reduction  RI, IF 1 
37 Economic Creation of jobs for installers FG - 
38 Social Alerting people of possible incidents with elderly friends 
and family  
FG - 
39 Social Minimizing the need for elderly people to regularly deal 
with meter readers  
FG - 
40 Technical  Quicker detection of faults  IF - 
41 Technical More accurate bills IF - 
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42 Technical More secure than traditional meters IF - 
Source: Authors. Note: aRI=research interview.  FG=focus group.  IF=internet forum. bFrequency 
counts conducted only for the interviews, as the focus groups and internet forums did not have a 
fixed number of respondents. 
 
 Social benefits were (perhaps surprisingly) tied with technical benefits for the most 
mentioned category. These social benefits related to the widening in awareness and visibility 
of energy consumption (see Figure 6), as well as the more practical benefits associated with 
making it easier to pay bills and the positive effects on vulnerable communities, blackouts, 
and those in poverty.  Many stated benefits result from the promise of more accurate bills. 
One important aspect of this is the potential end to ‘shock’ estimated bills and the 
uncertainties that have been associated with energy consumption and billing, which are one 
of the biggest sources of historical stress for more vulnerable energy users (benefits 7 and 
27). As well as more accurate bills based on real-time consumption, customers are also 
already reportedly benefitting from being saved the inconvenience of having to read meters 
(benefit 14).  In the focus groups, participants remarked how smart meters could particularly 
help elderly people:  
I suppose if an older person was in trouble, and didn’t use the energy that they were 
expected to use on a certain day, that could that somehow alert the company to think 
‘are they lying on the floor? They haven’t turned the TV or cooker on…’ and send 
someone to check on them. 
Elderly people may also prefer the fact that meter readings now also no longer need to be 
taken, as regular home visits by strangers were cited as a source of anxiety for many (benefits 
14, 39).  
Figure 6: A first generation British Gas smart meter in-home display for electricity and heat 
visualizing household consumption in real-time  
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Source: Authors  
 Proclaimed technical benefits span a range of activities including: the facilitation of 
demand response and distributed generation, efficiency improvements to grids, quicker 
detection of faults, and the enabling of smart homes and appliances. GB015 focused on the 
technical benefits of pre-paid meters, highlighting how these are ineluctably bound with 
social and economic dimensions: 
A big beneficiary are pre-payment customers. It blows my mind to see videos of old 
ladies crawling in the road to top up her pre-payment meter. With a smart meter you 
can top it up online, on a phone, etc. Also, at the moment, switching between pre-
payment and credit requires someone to install a brand-new meter, which is hugely 
expensive… The cost of the ‘pay zone’ system for pre-payment is hugely expensive. As 
a result, pre-payment customers, who are often the most vulnerable, are paying 
between £100 and £200 more for their energy than credit customers. Once you can 
reduce those costs, which smart meters do… those pre-payment customers can start 
saving money with a smart meter. 
In this way, smart meters were said to have positive synergies with other innovations such as 
advancements in payment plans.   
 Economic benefits are admittedly intertwined with some of the technical features of 
smart meters. The most mentioned benefit was that consumers with smart meters ultimately 
save money by using the data generated by the smart meter to identify ways in which they 
could save money on their energy consumption (benefit 1). This relates to the classic (though 
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somewhat contested2) idea of energy monitoring and feedback, whereby an increased (and 
interrelated) level of energy visibility and awareness (benefit 5) leads consumers to change 
their energy use habits, switching off appliances and using energy more strategically. 
Although some interviewees pointed out that poorer households may already be monitoring 
their energy use very closely (and so would have limited opportunities for making further 
savings), others stressed that smart meters could facilitate a de-mystification of energy, with 
usage becoming more (literally) visible, through the changing colors of the In-Home Display 
(IHD). As well as leading to reduced bills through more prudent usage of energy, it may also 
facilitate greater thermal benefits as customers use energy more strategically – getting more 
heat for less money (benefit 32). As “being able to quantify potential energy savings makes it 
a more compelling figure.” GB09 argued that the data generated by smart meters could also 
be used to make a more persuasive case for making investments in energy efficiency–
measures which could enable further financial savings. Smart meters could enable more 
decentralized generation by facilitating ‘peer to peer’ energy generation and trading (benefits 
6 and 15). 
 Political benefits included policy learning, national energy independence, and meeting 
campaign promises. As GB007 stated: 
If the government achieves it, the smart meter program will be held as a flagship 
initiative that we have led the world on, and they will talk about it as being a policy 
success.  
GB015 framed political benefits more in terms of energy security: 
Geopolitically, you can look at how better management of our energy is going to 
affect the extent we need to continue demanding energy from overseas.  Smart meters 
have the potential to minimize our dependence on foreign pipelines and resources. 
In this way benefits extended well beyond only households and small businesses.  
 Environmental benefits meanwhile centered on dimensions such as the continued 
decarbonization of electricity, the integration of renewables, and reduced overall energy use. 
Some interviewees maintained that smart meters are an essential component of the move 
towards more cost-efficient and ultimately less carbon-intensive electricity and energy 
generation and supply. As GB012 stated strongly: 
                                                 
2 See for example Buchanan et al. (2015). 
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I do not understand how you can expect to coordinate energy supply and demand 
effectively and most cheaply, in terms of prices for customers, without smart meters.  
Furthermore, on the demand-side, more efficient energy usage stimulated by behavior 
change may in turn (for those customers who were not already under-consuming energy, at 
least) lead to overall more efficient (and lower) energy usage, and a positive environmental 
benefit through lower emissions (benefit 4). As GB007 remarked, “anything that reduces 
energy demand will reduce the carbon intensity of the grid.” Provided the energy generated 
continues to be progressively decarbonized, these will be benefits that will accrue to all, 
within the UK and beyond. Locally, there could also be an end to the carbon footprint and air 
pollution generated by the need for regular meter readings (benefit 21). 
4. Discussion: Scale, temporality, spatiality, actors and incumbency  
 This section of the paper focuses inductively on more deeply analyzing and theorizing 
the co-benefits across our cases according to six cross-cutting themes or dimensions: 
complementarity, temporality, spatiality, actors, and incumbency. 
4.1 Complementarity: interoperability and co-synergies with other innovations  
This category of benefits relates to how each particular low carbon technology being 
examined can create positive synergies with other low carbon technologies or practices.  For 
example, although doubted by some respondents, nuclear power in France was credited by 
several others with enabling the integration of intermittent renewable sources of electricity 
such as wind and solar. As F005 noted: 
The advantage of nuclear is that it is baseload production, it is not intermittent. It runs 
regardless of the weather. It is very complementary to intermittent renewable 
resources, it is a tool for climate change prevention.  
Similarly, F015 stated:  
Going towards a low carbon electricity system is a huge challenge that is probably 
under-estimated by most. To achieve that you will need everything possible: more 
inter-connection between nuclear and solar PV, other renewables, more demand side 
management. The solution will be a combination of those technologies and services.  
Although some environmental activists in France have become resistant to the notion of 
expanding the use of EVs in France (because EV expansion is seen by them as being used by 
the nuclear lobby to support the argument for further nuclear expansion in order to power 
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EVs), it is undeniable that nuclear energy has some potential to be complementary – rather 
than antagonistic – to the development of certain renewable innovations (as argued 
judiciously in Cany et al. 2016).  
 Similarly, German solar panels were framed as being potentially synergetic with 
electric heat pumps, electric mobility and household storage. G001 remarked that: 
Renewable electricity is shifting into the transport sector and shifting in to the heating 
sector. We do have a rise in electricity mobility. We have over 4 million EVs in Germany 
if you count e-bikes and e-scooters. And we have increasing number of heat pumps, 
which is a conversion of electricity.  
Indeed, Germany has an aim of being greenhouse gas-neutral by 2050 (BMU, 2018), and its 
transport and heating sectors especially could benefit from the potential co-synergies with 
solar PV (and other renewables), given that Germany is, as one interviewee conceded, “not 
doing well in our climate change targets because the heating and transport sector is not doing 
well” (G007). Other benefits discussed included prosuming and coupling solar panels with 
home energy storage.   
In Norway, respondents suggested that EVs could be a first step towards the entire 
transformation of the transport and mobility system. As N006 speculated:  
The EVs we see today are really only stepping stones towards more sophisticated 
integrated transportation system where an electric pod picks you up where you live 
and takes you to a hub where you get on a bigger bus, or whatever, and that takes you 
to a smaller pod again which will take you to exactly where you want to go. You see 
these presentations all the time and it seems obvious it is going to that direction. 
N015 claimed that this could bring potential co-synergies between more integrated personal 
and public transport: 
We are looking at how to integrate EVs with walking and cycling more as part of 
public transport, but also how to integrate towards sharing solutions. That could be 
towards carpooling or Uber-type solutions. We are also developing technologies 
towards autonomous, smaller units. Which is more of an on-call type of service and 
with all these we believe, in not that many years down the road, public transport will 
look very different from today. It will be based on zero emissions solutions that are 
also public and individualized.   
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Here, there is clearly the potential for EVs to coupled or combined with other innovations 
such as ridesharing, mobility as a service, and automated (driverless) cars (Firnkorn & Müller 
2015; Axsen and Sovacool 2019). 
 Smart meters were identified as enabling peer-to-peer energy trading as well as EVs 
and integration of renewables. Respondents noted that consumers in Great Britain could 
combine smart meters with dynamic tariffs with EVs, storage, automated appliances, etc. to 
save money and to participate in the move towards a less carbon intensive grid by purchasing 
energy when it is cheapest (and less carbon intensive, i.e. at non-peaks times of day). As 
GB015 commented:  
EVs are essentially a battery on wheels.  With a smart meter, smart charger and EV, 
you can power your house from your battery during peak demand, getting free energy, 
and not taking energy from the grid. And then you can charge it at night, perhaps 
automatically, easing pressure on the grid, and saving money. Smart meters and EVs 
become a borderline utopian product. 
Respondents also noted that smart meters could enable more decentralized generation by 
facilitating “peer to peer” energy generation and trading, with the generation of more tangible 
data presenting a more quantifiable figure that lends itself to being traded. 
4.2 Temporality: Beyond the immediate and intergenerational issues 
 Our data shows how the collective benefits have strong temporal dimensions, with 
some relating more to the past, others specific to the present, while others are more 
uncertain and contingent on a complex interplay of technical, economic, social, political, and 
policy factors. 
Nuclear power in France was credited with generating significant historical benefits in 
the form of cheap electricity, but over time, these benefits have arguably diminished for 
subsequent generations. For example, because of a proliferation of new safety requirements 
caused by growing concerns over security and safety, the costs of decommissioning and 
waste management have risen over time (Schneider 2013). When added to the rising debt 
obligations and interest payments from financing costs incurred by the state in funding plant 
construction and maintenance, these costs are driving not only higher electricity prices for 
subsequent generations, but also the obligation for the state to raise general taxation. For 
some interviewees, the benefits may thus be structured by a strongly inter-generational 
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dynamic, with future generations potentially not only not benefitting from cheap electricity, 
but also having to bear the rising costs of decommissioning and waste management.  
In Germany, solar PV has benefitted those most who invested in the early days of the 
FIT scheme, as, although they had to pay for more expensive equipment and bear the 
greatest risks, they were compensated by the most generous levels of FIT. As G001 clarified: 
In a way, the success of the German transition is about timing. Some households were 
lucky enough to pick the right site and buy the equipment at the right time when there 
was a discount in the market, but they still locked in the high FIT. People who invested 
at that time, they got in excess of 60% return on capital or shareholder funds, 
guaranteed for 20 years. It was insane. 
This notion of risk, timing, and longevity was actually built into the FIT itself, which 
guaranteed an income for 20 years, but had a sliding-scale model that reduced subsidies 
every year, disproportionately incentivizing and rewarding early adoption (Mendonca et al. 
2009)3. As for long-term benefits, G004 noted that the main benefit would be “future 
generations benefiting from low carbon electricity production and mitigating climate change 
risk”.  
In Norway, early beneficiaries of EVs were the wealthier segments of the population, 
who were able to benefit from being able to “signal” their own prestige and virtue. Potential 
future benefits could however spill over to other transport sectors such as maritime, aviation, 
and buses, especially as Norway takes advantage of its low carbon electricity production, 
96.3% of which comes from hydro and pumped hydro as of 2016 (Statistics Norway, 2017). 
As N012 highlighted, Norway, in fact, has a vision of becoming the first fully electrical country 
in Europe, if not the world, and for the time being enjoys “a huge surplus of electricity” 
(N012). 
For smart meters, the immediate benefits to the user relate more to the new visibility 
of energy use data and to corresponding behavior change and convenience. Many of the 
more long-term benefits relate to the transformations in the supply and generation side that 
could, in turn – and if enacted fully – lead to transformed opportunities for the consumer and 
for a range of supply-side actors (Pereira et al. 2018).  
 
                                                 
3 This policy was eventually amended once policy makers realised that they had been too generous in the 
context of rapidly falling PV prices. 
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4.3 Spatiality and scale: beyond households or even countries  
 Many of the presumed benefits cross multiple scales, in some cases extending well 
beyond the individual countries. In France, the massive surplus in electricity generation from 
nuclear plants is credited with enabling France to export energy to neighboring countries, 
leading to revenues accruing to the French state and allowing other countries to benefit from 
cheap energy imports (benefits 10 and 14). As F013 noted: 
Nuclear technology transfer to China has worked really well. EDF is considered a very 
strong utility on safety, so they do international sharing of best practices. Our safety 
authorities also collaborate with other safety authorities and they do a lot of sharing. 
Other countries also benefitted from France’s re-processing facilities, which enabled them to 
delay expenditure on expensive new programs in other energy areas (benefit 26).  
Although the transfer of jobs away from Germany is seen by many as one of the most 
negative “subplots” of the solar PV story in the country, it is also true to state that the 
German solar transition benefitted manufacturers in other countries, especially, in China. As 
G003 remarked: 
In a way, Germany with hundreds of billions of euros helped the Chinese to develop a 
new industry because everything was developed here in Germany and it was ready to 
market. Then the Chinese bought these technologies, bought these companies, or 
invented their own ones. In some cases, they even stole patents or copied 
technologies. They found a market that was ready here in Germany, based on our FIT 
system. They did not only copy or buy technologies that we have highly subsidized to 
become bankable and marketable, but they took over our market in Germany as well. 
At a certain point, 55% of all PV installed worldwide, globally, has been installed in 
Germany. Incredible. And I think most of the panels that have been sold in Germany 
are Chinese.  
G007 affirmed this point in stating that “I think the German solar transition has been a very 
good program for China, actually!” and that “China has benefitted enormously.” Others 
recognized that the German solar FIT indirectly “financed the learning curve for PV globally” 
(G004), benefitted others in Europe (such as “Greece, Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom,”) 
(G005), and that it also holds potential for “those who need solar PV for modern energy 
access in Africa and Asia” (G006).  
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 Norwegian EVs were similarly credited with meaningfully contributing to the 
development of a cleaner global passenger car fleet. As N006 remarked: 
Other places and markets have a lot more to gain from the EV transition here 
environmentally than we do, because it was not so bad here to begin with, we are a 
sparsely populated country and most cars are not that old. But if China or Southeast 
Asia goes electric, that will have a much more positive impact. 
N016 supported this view, remarking that Norway has shown the world that an EV transition 
“is possible.”  
 For smart meters, multiple respondents discussed how the program in Great Britain 
offered what GB007 called valuable “lessons for other countries.” As GB016 remarked: 
From an infrastructure perspective, the lessons, the budget, the business plan are all 
published and transparent. Other countries will look very closely at it because it is very 
transparent and accessible, they can see the costs and process, seeing what to do and 
not to do. In other countries there isn’t the transparency or the infrastructure and 
there isn’t the future-proofing that the DCC gives you. It is a big plus for everyone 
outside of the UK.   
Relatedly, GB008 talked about other governments that have not rolled out smart meters yet 
being “shared learners;” and GB011 stated that “there are learnings based on the data that 
could be exported to other countries, in terms of benchmarking and monitoring.” GB014 
meanwhile commented that “other countries may look at Great Britain’s roll out and draw 
some lessons from it.” Finally, GB015 underscored that “there’s a cross-border trade in 
information” resulting from the smart meter program.   
4.4 Actors: beyond users or consumers 
Our data reveals that many of the benefits brought by low carbon transitions extend 
beyond the immediate energy or mobility actors (the users or consumers) to other actors 
across the supply chain. In France, jobs and amenities for communities near power plants 
were recognized as disproportionately accruing to the areas around the power plants, many 
of which were recognized as being otherwise “peripheral” and under-developed regions. As 
one interviewee (F007) stated: 
The benefits are very centered on people living around the nuclear power plants, which 
is why they don’t want to see them closed. This is why people protest against closures, 
because they know that when you are living near a plant you have a music school, 
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swimming pool, and money for sports clubs, and it’s very linked to the daily life of 
people.  
These areas received higher investment and better facilities, as well as being the source of 
hundreds of direct jobs (benefit 11). 
 Similarly, in Germany, solar PV has also benefited rural development in areas that 
otherwise may have suffered a lack of investment or under-population. As G001 highlighted: 
If you’d come 8 years ago, we would have discussed how the Germans are fleeing the 
countryside and moving into the city. Depopulation of the countryside was a big theme 
10 years ago to 7 years ago. That stopped in part because of the renewable energy 
industry. And it’s not just solar, it’s also the biomass, it’s also the wind. They’re all 
activities that take place in the countryside, not in the cities. 
Solar PV was also connected with broader industrial development, with G001 noting a 
(temporarily) thriving “solar panel manufacturing infrastructure” that benefitted “designers, 
developers, and innovators.” G002 commented on how German solar energy benefitted not 
only those “who build PV panels on their roofs, but also an industry especially in the new 
Bundesländer, the Eastern part of Germany. So, it was also kind of industrial policy and 
structural support policy for these areas.” 
 In Norway, the benefits from EVs accrue to actors beyond merely the users of EVs 
themselves. N014 emphasized how Norwegian policy has spurred innovation for companies 
such as Tesla, as well as companies offering services related to charging infrastructure. N012 
commented on how electricity suppliers benefit hugely from EVs as they can now provide fuel 
to large numbers of new customers. 
 In Great Britain, smart meters were associated with stimulating a host of new digital 
innovations across entirely new business models. GB007 stated that “there is an almost infinite 
potential for new energy services or business models to emerge, to build on the infrastructure 
of smart meters, and to use data-driven services to help people.” GB010 added that “we’re 
going to see energy bundled up in a range of other services that will bring new opportunities 
for profit, and people will look to effectively create value out of the data streams that come in 
there.” 
4.5 Incumbency: Disruption and democracy 
A final way of thinking about the co-benefits of low carbon innovation is the degree to 
which they disrupt patterns of socio-technical and political-economic incumbency (Johnstone 
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and Kivimaa 2018).  Importantly, this disruption may be specifically enabled by the fact that 
many of the innovations are user-based; demand more direct involvement and participation 
in energy decision-making; and allow individuals, households, or businesses to 
circumnavigate large, centralized incumbents (Schot et al. 2016). For this reason, some have 
claimed that these dynamics may potentially stimulate a greater degree of energy citizenship, 
participation, and ultimately democracy (Lockwood et al. 2013; Burke et al. 2017). 
In terms of the four cases examined in this article, it could be argued that all four 
innovations have, in different ways, had this disruptive influence over the prevailing energy 
system, undermining pre-existing modalities and making new ones more viable or attractive.  
In France, although nuclear power is clearly itself a centralized form of energy that has been 
famously associated with France’s centralized style of governance, it was undoubtedly 
disruptive in eroding the power of coal unions within the country and facilitating a shift away 
from the polluting coal industry – which improved air quality for many regions of France 
(Solomon & Krishna 2011). Moreover, the fact that nuclear is such a polarizing technology 
has also paradoxically been responsible for mobilizing and stimulating environmental 
awareness within France, as well as in actually improving the operation of the nuclear 
industry by forcing it to adopt higher standards. As F013 conceded: “I think the industry has 
done a good job on safety, maybe because there was pressure from anti-nuclear groups!”  
In the other three cases, the more direct user-interface nature of the innovations 
makes them inherently amenable to more decentralized technical operation, and, as such, 
opens up opportunities for a greater degree of user participation and decentralized energy 
generation and governance. In the German solar case, for example, not only has the 
transition enabled a reduction in coal use, but it has also engendered a high degree of citizen 
participation in energy debates and has facilitated greater involvement in renewables and 
decentralized generation. As G006 argues: 
You could talk about other values beyond financial things. What we still have in 
the Germany society is green thinking, so besides money people look at 
autonomy. Buildings are not autonomous… they decrease the share of 
dependence from the grid and from the utility. So that’s also a participation in 
energy production and generation. So, citizens participate in an infrastructure that 
was previously dominated by very few large companies. That’s also kind of a 
benefit. 
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Similarly, in Norway, there is an argument that EVs have stimulated energy and climate 
change awareness and facilitated participation in energy transitions among constituencies 
who would not traditionally have been associated with such movements. As N014 stated: 
What you can see from the statistics and the qualitative interviews we have done 
with users, many say that they have become more interested and more aware in 
energy consumption as a whole. So, they are taking this EV practice and the things 
they learnt through the engagement of this technology to other domains, for 
instance energy use in the house. There is a positive kind of rebound effect that 
most people talk about. 
Although many of the disruptive democratic benefits in the UK are more hypothetical due to 
the incipient nature of the smart meter roll-out, most interviewees recognized that smart 
meters have huge potential to stimulate new business models and decentralized and 
distributed energy generation – trends that are likely to lead to greater user engagement and 
a reduction in centralized incumbent power. As GB012 argued: 
The thing that is important about smart meters is that they are a building block 
for new services and new ways of operating the system that are necessary, that 
allow customers to become active without them necessarily having to do anything 
about it, and then maybe get cheaper electricity or something like that. And 
honestly, if we don’t operate the system more effectively then we can’t have 
renewables, and so, it’s one of these essential building blocks 
GB012 also stressed however that these benefits were dependent on the correct regulatory 
reforms being made that would take advantage of the new technical opportunities to bring 
this new system into being.  
5. Conclusion and Implications  
On aggregate, our interviews, focus groups, and internet forums across France, 
Germany, Norway and Great Britain resulted in an inventory of 128 presumed co-benefits to 
four low carbon transitions. As Figure 7 summarizes, a significant number of these were 
economic (37), such as fuel savings, jobs, exports, and profits. Others were environmental 
(14), such as displaced air pollution, mitigated climate change, reduced land use impacts, and 
other avoided externalities. But apart from these, our remaining 77 co-benefits do not fall 
into these broad categories of “cost” and “carbon.” We captured 30 social benefits, as 
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diverse as the way in which nuclear power galvanized national pride in France to the way in 
which electric vehicles elicited positive feelings of prestige and environmental consciousness 
in Norway. We captured 31 technical benefits, from the ways in which smart meters are 
facilitating distributed generation in Great Britain to the ways in which PV stimulated 
innovations in solar PV technology in Germany. We captured 16 political benefits, from policy 
learning across all four cases, as well as improvements to energy security and reduced energy 
dependence in all four cases.  As Figure 7 also illustrates, when the data is transposed by 
country, Great Britain had the most potential co-benefits identified (42) followed by France 
(30) and Germany (30) with Norway (26) at the bottom.  With this in mind, we offer three 
conclusions. 
Figure 7: Summary of the 128 co-benefits to low carbon transitions by dimension and country  
 
a. Top panel: by co-benefit  
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Source: Authors  
First, for the energy studies and energy economics communities, we may need more 
sophisticated modeling, policy analysis, and even research designs that are capable of 
understanding and capturing the non-environmental and non-economic aspects of low 
carbon innovation.  This holds especially true for social and political co-benefits, such as 
national pride (France), energy democracy (Germany), greater environmental consciousness 
(Norway), or feelings of comfort and convenience (Great Britain).  Capturing these profuse, 
and at times obscure, co-benefits is especially important for the more difficult-to-predict (or 
quantify) dimensions, such as those relating to social and political processes.  This finding 
becomes even more salient when such co-benefits have varying temporal timeframes, spatial 
scales, actors, and effects on incumbency and democracy. As such, we confirm the findings 
arising from Ürge-Vorsatz et al. (2014) and Bhardwaj et al. (2019), that the analysis of co-
benefits, or energy and climate policy, demands a multiple-objective and multiple-impact 
framework. 
Secondly, the complementarity and interoperability of innovations implies that 
transitions may gain momentum when multiple innovations are linked together in ways that 
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is that future low carbon transitions may require complementary innovations across an array 
of technologies, including those examined here, but also others, including:  
• energy storage (e.g. batteries, flywheels, compressed air, pumped hydro); 
• smart grids (to enhance flexibility and grid management); 
• demand response (combining new tariffs and smart meters); 
• network expansion (to increase capacity, connect remote renewables and link to 
neighboring systems) and to enable peer-to-peer trading; and 
• new business models and market arrangements (such as capacity markets to ensure 
back-up generation). 
Such complementarity of innovations suggests the need to move beyond analyzing individual 
technologies to entire systems.  Indeed, it is not possible to fully distinguish the national 
versus technology differences across our four case studies because we only analyzed one 
technology per country, rather than the same technology across all four countries, or all four 
technologies across all four countries. 
Thirdly, looking across these four transitions as a whole, our results pose 
methodological questions for low carbon energy transition research generally. Our findings, 
even though they are qualitative in nature, indicate that simple research designs (or policy 
mixes) that typically center on examining relationships between dependent and independent 
variables in order to develop generalizable laws may be inadequate in capturing the empirical 
complexity and multidimensionality of the transitions themselves. Certainly, rather than 
attempting to narrowly identify an omniscient causal relationship in any of our transitions 
that could yield the types of co-benefits we identify, our findings suggest that it may be more 
fruitful to search rather for combinations of multiple causal mechanisms and conjunctions 
between event chains (Ragin 2008).  Analysts and policymakers should therefore aim to look 
beyond carbon pricing, and exclusively economic or environmental benefits, instruments, and 
institutions. Instead, they must recognize—and perhaps even celebrate—that low carbon 
transitions are ultimately processes that are as entangled in social affairs, political events, 
and technical innovation dynamics as they are in environmental and economic domains.  
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7. Appendix I: Research design data tables 
Table A1: Semi-structured expert research interviews  
Country 
 
Respondent number Stakeholder type 
France F001 Academia 
F002 Academia 
F003 Non-profit/civil society 




F008 Think tank 
F009 Think tank 
F010 Non-profit/civil society 
F011 Academia 
F012 Non-profit/civil society 
F013 Industry 
F014 Academia 
F015 Think tank 
F016 Non-profit/civil society 
Germany G001 Non-profit/civil society 
G002 Industry 
G003 Industry  
G004 Government/regulator 
G005 Non-profit/civil society 
G006 Academia 
G007 Government/regulator 
G008 Non-profit/civil society 
G009 Non-profit/civil society 
G010 Industry - Trade body 
G011 Consultant  
G012 Industry 
G013 Non-profit/civil society 
G014 Academia 
G015 Government/regulator 
G016 Non-profit/civil society 
Norway  N001 Academia 
N002 Industry  
N003 Industry  
N004 Industry 
N005 Academia 
N006 Industry  
N007 Non-profit/civil society 
N008 Non-profit/civil society 
N009 Non-profit/civil society 
N010 Government/regulator 
N011 Non-profit/civil society 
N012 Industry 
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N013 Government/regulator  
N014 Academia 
N015 Industry  
N016 Industry  
Great Britain  GB001 Academia 
GB002 Government/regulator  
GB003 Industry 
GB004 Non-profit/civil society 
GB005 Non-profit/civil society 
GB006 Non-profit/civil society 
GB007 Academia 
GB008 Non-profit/civil society 




GB013 Non-profit/civil society 
GB014 Government/regulator  
GB015 Industry  
GB016 Industry  
Source: Authors 
 
Table A2: Public focus groups  
Country Location Participants  
GB Lewes 2  
France Colmar 3  
Germany Freiburg 4* 
Norway Stavanger 6 
* Across two focus groups. Source: Authors  
Table A3: Public internet forum discussions  
Country case study Forum Description Members Responses 
Norway Elbilforum.no Norwegian EV forum 20,487 7 
Norway Tesla motors club Norway Online forum for Tesla 
owners in Norway 
N/A 4 
Norway SpeakEV Online electric car forum 
for all EV owners and 
enthusiasts 
16,152 0 
Germany Photovoltaik forum.com A solar forum in German 100,823 2 
Germany Solarstrom-forum.de Photovoltaic forum in 
German 
2,329 0 
Germany Building Technology Forum - 
Solar Energy 




GB  Money Saving Expert Consumer forum  1,778,314 1 
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GB  Navitron Private company forum on 
a range of energy issues 
7139 0 
GB  OVO Energy Private company forum on 
a range of energy issues 
  0 




France Que Choisir Consumer forum 130536 1 
France Forum photovoltaique Energy forum 42596 5 
France Droit Finances Consumer finances forum N/A 0 
Source: Authors  
 
